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 Recent studies of 2-sided matching mechanisms have suggested potential benefits 
for implementation into the Navy enlisted assignment process.  The proposed matching 
process improves the chance of commands and sailors being assigned to a party of 
choice.  The same studies focused on a particular two-sided Deferred Acceptance (DA) 
matching algorithm which ensures stable matches, prevents “off-the-site” trades between 
the matching parties and upholds integrity of the matching system.  Although stable 
matches are important in a voluntary labor market, the DA algorithm may still favor one 
party depending on whether the command or sailor biased form of the algorithm is used. 
 
The Linear Programming (LP) algorithm is an alternative that could optimize 
system (command and sailor) effectiveness and promote a balanced approach to meeting 
the preferences of both parties.  Although LP does not guarantee stable matches, it is still 
employed by selective British hospitals for their matching with interns.  The extent of the 
unstable matches has not been examined to measure it against the benefit of higher 
system effectiveness.  This thesis will evaluate if the LP algorithm could serve as a better 
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At the Second Annual Navy Workforce Research and Analysis Conference held 
from the 14 to 15 February 2002, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), Hon. 
William A. Navas, Jr., laid out the agenda for Navy Manpower, Personnel and Training 
(MPT) Research and Development.  He stressed that people were the critical multiplier for 
readiness and capability, underlined by the fact that three-fifths of DON’s budget is catered 
to the manpower, personnel and training system.  With limited resources available, trade-
offs must be made and success rests on developing an expert knowledge of the complex 
Manpower, Personnel and Training processes.  Mr Navas highlighted that the DON must be 
able to: 
 
• Effectively use the total force – that is, requiring fewer people and making 
better acquisition /design decisions with people in mind, 
• Improve its ability to recruit and retain the right people for the right jobs, 
• Improve the return from its training investment, 
• Improve force management, 
• Optimize compensation and benefits, and 
• Solve organizational issues that limit DON’s ability to plan and manage 
effectively. 
In order to achieve success on these six key areas, Mr Navas elaborated on the need 
to incorporate more flexible career management with customer-centered processes, 
maximize sailor choice and measure performance of both people and systems.  
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In response to the agenda set by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), the 
Commander, Navy Personnel Command (NPC), RADM Jacob Shuford, outlined NPC’s 
strategic priorities at the same conference as: 
• “Project Success,” 
• Sailor Relationship Management, and 
• Strategic IT and R&D investment. 
 
Specifically for the “success of existing projects,” RADM Shuford indicated that 
sailor career management would undergo a transformational change with the introduction of 
a web-based marketplace for enlisted distribution and assignment.  However, before full- 
scale implementation of the web-based marketplace occurs, a feasibility study will be 
conducted with an E-9 detailing pilot in October 2002.  The E-9 detailing pilot culminates a 
review of the current enlisted distribution process and its subsequent redesign currently 
being undertaken by the Naval Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology (NPRST) in 
partnership with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the University of Memphis and the 
University of Mississippi.  The web-based market place will incorporate both sailor and 
command preferences in an automated two-sided matching mechanism. 
 
Two-sided matching mechanisms have been used in the entry-level labor market for 
new physicians, organized via the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), since the 
1950s, and by the labor market for British medical interns and hospitals since the 1970s. 
Whilst the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm was used for matching in the NRMP, the 
British markets have used three categories of matching algorithms: the priority, deferred 
acceptance and linear programming (LP) algorithms. Of the three algorithms used, the 
priority algorithm used in Newcastle, Sheffield, Birmingham and Edinburgh was abandoned 
due to unstable matches and an increase in the number of applicants submitting only one 
choice. Currently two matching mechanisms survive in Britain: the LP algorithm used in 
London and Cambridge and the DA algorithm used in Edinburgh. These two matching 







This thesis will evaluate the use of Linear Programming as an alternative two-sided 
matching algorithm and compare its performance against the DA algorithm in the U.S. 
Navy’s enlisted distribution market.  Performance measures will be developed and the 
matching results evaluated with these measures, through simulation of the two-sided 
matching process.  Whilst the DA algorithm guarantees a stable match (Roth, 1990), the 
“optimal” match favors only one side of the labor market, depending on which party 
initiated the matching process; that is, the command biased DA algorithm favors the 
commands, and vice versa.  Although the LP algorithm does not eliminate unstable matches, 
it can provide a more balanced approach, ending up with an assignment that caters to both 
parties.  The number of unstable matches that results may not be very large.  
 
Past simulation studies on the two-sided DA algorithm had been used with estimated 
preference factors (Ng and Soh, 2001). The same simulation also assumed a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function (i.e., interactions amongst the preference factors) to derive the preference 
list.  A survey was conducted on the Aviation Support Equipment Technician (AS) rating 
(Butler and Molina, 2002) to determine a more realistic set of preference factors. This thesis 
will evaluate the benefits and shortfalls of the LP algorithm using a revised Utility function, 
while incorporating the more realistic/representative preference factors using Molina & 
Butler’s findings. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the relative performance of the Linear Programming and the Deferred 





2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What are the measures of success for two-sided matching regardless of 
matching mechanisms used? 
• What is a more robust simulation model to evaluate the performance of 
Linear Programming vice the Deferred Acceptance matching mechanism? 
 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATION 
 
1. Scope 
The scope of the thesis will include: 
• An overview of the current USN enlisted assignment process and a 
discussion of its shortcomings. 
• A review of the existing simulation program, its characteristics and a 
description of the enhancements required. 
• An enhancement of the existing simulation program for use in two-sided 
matching. 
• A review of the matching mechanisms: specifically the Linear Programming 
and the Deferred Acceptance mechanisms. 
• A description of the performance measures used to evaluate the two 
matching mechanisms. 
• A series of simulations of the two-sided matching process using both the 
Linear Programming and Deferred Acceptance matching mechanisms.  
• An evaluation of the performance of the Linear Programming vice the 








This study will only simulate the U.S. Navy enlisted detailing process and compare 
the performance of the Linear Programming vice the Deferred Acceptance matching 
mechanism in conducting two-sided matching.  Thus, the thesis will not cover other 
matching mechanisms nor will it cover the officer community. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in the thesis will consist of the following steps: 
 
• Conduct a literature search of books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems 
and other library information resources. 
• Review the current U.S. Navy manpower planning process focusing on the 
area of distribution and assignment (detailing). 
• Review the Linear Programming and Deferred Acceptance matching 
mechanisms. 
• Review the existing software program developed for simulation of two-sided 
matching. 
• Revise the simulation program. 
• Conduct simulations with both the Linear Programming and Deferred 
Acceptance matching mechanisms. 
• Detail the results of the simulation and conduct an analysis of the results. 
• Obtain conclusions from the simulation results.  
 
F. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
Research is being done by NPRST to determine how two-sided matching can be 
implemented in the Navy.  This thesis will provide additional information on the effects of 
two-sided matching using actual sailor and command preferences, and evaluate whether 
Linear Programming or the Deferred Acceptance matching mechanism would be more 
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appropriate for use.  The results from these simulations can then be compared subsequently 
with actual results from the trial.  
 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis will be organized as follows: 
 
• Chapter II will provide an overview of the current U.S. enlisted assignment 
process. 
• Chapter III will provide an overview of the existing simulation program and 
describe the DA algorithm. 
• Chapter IV will describe the enhancements made to the simulation program 
and the LP algorithm. 
• Chapter V will detail the findings of the simulations and analyze the results. 




II. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT U.S. NAVY ENLISTED 
ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
A. THE MANPOWER, PERSONNEL AND TRAINING SYSTEM  
The United States Navy’s Manpower, Personnel and Training system consists of 
four processes: (i) Manpower Requirements; (ii) Manpower Programming; (iii) Personnel 
Planning and (iv) Personnel Distribution.  The Manpower, Personnel and Training System is 


































Figure 1.   The U.S. Navy Manpower, Personnel and Training System (From: Manpower, Personnel and 
Training Processes power-point brief by CDR William D. Hatch, June 2001) 
 
 
This thesis will focus on the personnel distribution process of the Manpower, 






B. THE PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 
The Personnel Distribution Process consists of three sub-processes known as the 
distribution triad.  The three sub-processes are allocation, placement and assignment or 
detailing.  The goal of the personnel distribution process is to get the right sailor with the 
right training to the right billet at the right time, or “R4” as it is better known.  This section 
will only highlight the key aspects of the personnel distribution process.  A more complete 
description of the personnel distribution process is given in “Characterizing Sailor and 
Command Enlisted Placement and Assignment Preferences” (Butler and Molina, 2002). 
 
1. The Allocation Sub-Process 
Navy Personnel Command is responsible for the allocation sub-process.  Before 
allocation can be done, the total available personnel (or personnel inventory) must first be 
separated into distributable inventory and non-distributable inventory.  Non-distributable 
inventory consist of persons in the Transient, Patient, Prisoner or Holdee (TPPH) list, 
persons who are Awaiting Instruction (AI), Students and persons whose End of Active 
Obligated Service (EAOS) is less than nine months away.  These three categories of people 
will be put into the Individuals Account (IA).  The allocation process then apportions the 
distributable inventory to the four Manning Control Authorities (MCAs) according to 
manning priorities established by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).  The four Manning 
Control Authorities include Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (MCA-P), 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (MCA-L), Commander, Navy Personnel 
Command (MCA-B), and Commander, Naval Reserve Forces (MCA-R).  The 
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Figure 2.   Categorization of Personnel Inventory (After: Manpower, Personnel and Training Processes power-




The output of the allocation sub-process is the promulgation of the Navy Manning 
Plan (NMP), which is a detailed document showing the prioritized allocation of distributable 
inventory to the various Manning Control Authorities down to the individual commands.  
The NMP guides the subsequent sub-processes of placement and assignment by specifying 
the number and characteristics of the sailor (Rate, Rating and Navy Enlisted Classification) 
that each command will get by indicating if the billets are Priority 1, 2 or 3 or no priority.  
Priority 1 and 2 billets are rationalized across the MCAs whilst Priority 3 billets are 
















Figure 3.   The Allocation Sub-Process 
 
9 
2. The Placement Sub-Process 
The Enlisted Placement Management Center (EPMAC) is responsible for the 
placement sub-process, which is the second leg of the distribution triad.  EPMAC acts as the 
command advocate for the E-5 to E-9 sailors and strives to achieve R4 by ensuring that the 
right person, with the proper occupational skills, occupies the right billet on time.  The 
placement officers in EPMAC use the NMP as a reference document to communicate the 
command’s billet requirements to the detailers.  Besides executing the NMP, placement 
officers also have to deal with additional requisitions when MCAs have activities that 
require a manning above the NMP or when losses are unplanned and differ from those 
projected in the NMP.  The placement officers are in charge of a set of ratings and Navy 
Enlisted Classifications (NECs) and negotiate with detailers who are more focused on a 
specific rating or NEC.  The placement sub-process is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Inputs 
Navy Manning Plan 
Projected Command 
Losses 







Figure 4.   The Placement Sub-Process 
 
 
3. The Assignment Sub-Process 
The assignment sub-process is the third and final leg of the distribution triad and is 
also known as the detailing sub-process.  The detailer is the principal agent in the 
assignment sub-process and is the sailor advocate.  The detailer will match sailors with the 
necessary skill sets to the prioritized requisitions.  The assignment sub-process repeats every 
two weeks in what is known as the requisition cycle, and typically, each detailer will  assign 
45 sailors across 60 billets every requisition cycle.  During each requisition cycle, detailers 




For each billet, the sailors are short-listed by their ‘must have’ attributes; that is, 
characteristics that the sailor must possess before they can be considered for the billet.  The 
‘must have’ attributes include the sailor’s rate, rating, NEC, skill set vice the billet, gender, 
projected rotation date (PRD), sea-shore rotation cycles and security classification.  If the 
sailor does not have the skill set for the billet, the detailer can consider sending the sailor to 
School to acquire the skill set, if there are school house vacancies.  After the shortlist, the 
sailors are then selected for the billet based on considerations which include requisition 
policies, Navy Manning Plan, fleet balances, Job Advertising and Selection System (JASS) 
preferences, Permanent Change of Station (PCS) costs, co-location of married couples, and 
promotion/career opportunities.  
 
Once the detailer has made the assignments, electronic orders are written in the 
Enlisted Assignment Information System (EAIS).  However, before the paper orders are 
written and sent to the sailor, assignments for sailors of rate E-5 and above are reviewed by 
EPMAC for billet fit and policy conformance.  EPMAC can disapprove orders that fail to 
meet Fleet readiness, manning and allocation targets.  Historically, this has occurred only 
about 3% of the time.  Once the orders are approved, written orders are sent to the sailor.  
 
After the sailors in a requisition cycle are assigned to available billets, new 
requisitions are uploaded from the EPRES and the detailer releases new billets into JASS, 
restarting the two-week cycle.  Sailors and billets not matched in the cycle are rolled over to 
the next cycle to be considered again.   
 
The Command Career Counselor (CCC) is the other resident agent in the assignment 
sub-process and assists the sailors in selecting their 5 most preferred billets and in 
electronically submitting their preferences into JASS.  The CCC will assist the sailors in 
identifying jobs for which they are qualified by using a combination of training, experience 
and written manuals.  The CCC will also factor in the sailors’ desires and personal concerns, 
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which include, location, career for their spouse and advancement opportunities.  The 















Orders for matched 
Sailors and Billets 
 
Unmatched Sailors 
and Billets rolled 
over to next 
requisition cycle 
 
Figure 5.   The Assignment Sub-Process 
 
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 
 From an economics perspective, the allocation and placement sub-processes seek to 
define the demand for labor; the assignment sub-process seeks to define the supply of labor 
and, at the same time, clears the labor market by matching sailors and billets.  The 
assignment sub-process is then the critical step since it performs the market clearing 
function.  However, the assignment sub-process is not as effective and efficient as it could 
be due to several shortcomings.  
 
1. Ineffectiveness 
The assignment sub-process is not as effective as it could be as it is manual and 
relies on the detailer.  Consequently, non-optimal assignments can arise and human error is 
possible which impacts whether the commands get who they want and whether the sailor’s 
needs and preferences are fulfilled.  Another consequence is that both sailors and commands 
perceive the assignment sub-process as subjective. 
 
a. Sub-Optimal Assignments and Human Error 
Sub-optimal assignments and human error can result from the high volume of 
information that the detailer has to consider when making assignments.  Firstly, there are the 
various policies and procedures promulgated by the DoD, CNO, MCAs and the CNPC to 
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consider.  These include factors like PCS cost, Fleet balance, requisition priorities, gapped 
billets, sea/shore rotation, pay grade, gender and the number of family members.  Secondly, 
there is a need to consider the sailor’s ‘must have’ attributes to see if the sailor has the pre-
requisites for the job and then make the assignment based on the sailor’s ‘should have’ 
attributes.  Thirdly, the sailor’s preferences will somehow have to be factored into the 
equation as well. 
 
Besides the volume of information to be processed, non-optimal assignments 
and human error can occur since assignments depend on the detailer’s ability to distinguish 
between the important ‘must have’ and ‘should have’ attributes of the sailor.  As this ability 
is a function of the detailer’s knowledge and experience, variability in performance can arise 
because of the variation in both knowledge and experience of the detailers.  There is an 
indication that this is true as the AS Commands’ have listed that the two top reasons for 
them to intervene in the assignment process is being assigned sailors with the wrong 
paygrade or wrong NEC (Butler and Molina, 2002).  
 
b. Perception of Subjectivity 
 Although JASS allows sailors to express up to 5 billet preferences, and 
command needs are reflected as requisitions in priority order in the allocation and placement 
sub-processes, sailors and commands still perceive the distribution process as being 
subjective because both have relinquished the market clearing function to the detailer, an 
intermediary, instead of performing the function themselves.  In fact, sailors believe that 
they will receive better or different job options by directly contacting the detailer and 
obtaining insider information (Short, 2000).  To make matters worse, there are also no 
objective performance measures to indicate how well the assignment ranks relative to the 







The assignment sub-process is also not as efficient as it could be because it is 
manual and relies on the detailer.  Specifically, the assignment sub-process is labor intensive 
and has a long lead time.  
 
a. Labor Intensive and Redundancies 
There are about 294 enlisted detailers managing the careers of nearly 330,000 
sailors.  There are also command career counselors to assist the sailor in making choices and 
expressing their preferences.  Some of these command career counselor billets are collateral 
duties in the smaller commands, but they are dedicated billets in major commands.  As such, 
there is an overlap between the functions of the detailer and the command career counselor.  
There are also redundancies built into the orders writing sub-process, where EPMAC clears 
the orders for sailors of rate E-5 and above to ensure policy conformance.  The current 
process is highly labor intensive and requires a lot of coordination between different groups 
of professionals.  This results in low service quality, where sailors feel frustrated about their 
ability to access their detailer via the telephone and electronic mail (Butler and Molina, 
2002) 
 
b. Long Lead Time 
The lead time for the assignment sub-process can be considered long.  Sailors 
will look at or will be considered for assignments nine months prior to their PRD.  The 
whole assignment sub-process can take five to nine months and the sailor can receive 
written orders anywhere from five months prior to three months after their PRD; the target 
should be for sailors to receive their orders 6 months prior to their PRD so that there is 
sufficient time for the sailor to prepare for the change of duty station.  The long lead times 
are a result of the negotiations between the sailor and detailer and between the detailer and 
placement officer.   If the time taken to complete an assignment is reduced, sailors would 
have sufficient time to schedule and prepare for a move. 
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 D. AN ALTERNATIVE  
The effectiveness and efficiency shortcomings in the current detailing sub-process 
are a result of the need to coordinate and process large amounts of information from 
different agencies through a central clearing house that is not as aware of the command and 
sailor preferences as the command and sailor themselves.  Thus, a mechanism that allows 
information to be exchanged between the buyer (command) and the sellers of labor (sailor), 
and facilitates an objective match of preferences, will improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the detailing sub-process.  
 
 Two-sided matching labor markets offer the potential to address the effectiveness 
and efficiency shortcomings of the current detailing sub-process (Robards, 2001) and the 
concept of the two-sided matching market was demonstrated to be viable through 
simulations (Ng and Soh, 2001).  However, these studies have focused on a particular two-
sided Deferred Acceptance (DA) matching algorithm that ensures stable matches and 
prevents “off-the-site” trades between the matching parties, thereby upholding the integrity 
of the matching system.  Although stable matches are important in a voluntary labor market, 
the DA algorithm may still favor one party depending on whether the command or sailor 
biased form of the algorithm is used. 
 
The Linear Programming (LP) algorithm is an alternative that could optimize system 
(command and sailor) effectiveness and promote a balanced approach to meeting the 
preferences of both parties.  Although LP does not guarantee stable matches, it is still 
employed by selective British hospitals for their matching with interns.  The extent of the 
unstable matches has not been examined, trade-off against the benefit of higher system 
effectiveness.  This thesis will evaluate if the LP algorithm could serve as a better 
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III. THE AGENT BASED EMPLOYMENT MARKET SIMULATOR 
(ABEMS) 
A. TWO-SIDED MATCHING 
Three different mechanisms have been used in the two-sided matching of medical 
interns to consultants in Britain (Ünver, 2001).  The three algorithms are: (a) Deferred 
Acceptance (DA), (b) Linear Programming (LP), and (c) Priority.  The DA mechanism is 
predominant in assigning medical interns in the US and UK hospitals, as it generates stable 
matches.  Because the LP algorithm does not guarantee stable matches, it is not as common 
as the DA mechanism.  The LP algorithm is used in Newcastle and Birmingham hospitals.  
The priority mechanism is no longer in use because of problems that led to hospitals hiring 
interns up to two years in advance of their graduation dates.  Many of the interns also only 
list a single choice in their applications.  A brief description of these three algorithms (using 
potential matching examples of consultants and interns) is given as follows: 
   
1. Deferred Acceptance (DA) 
Assume that a potential match exists between consultants and interns and each 
consultant and intern have a rank-order list profile Q(f) and Q(ω) respectively.  Each 
consultant, f, starts the process by indicating an interest or “proposing” to his most preferred 
intern with respect to Q(f). Each intern, ω, temporarily accepts the best consultant’s 
proposal if he is in her rank-order list profile Q(ω), while refusing the remaining candidates. 
At any other iteration, each consultant, f, who does not have a held offer, proposes to the 
next best intern in Q(f) who has not yet rejected his proposal. Each intern, ω, holds only the 
best consultant’s proposal with respect to Q(ω) among the one she keeps from the previous 
step and the new proposal at this iteration, while refusing other candidates. When none of 
the offers are rejected at a step, the algorithm stops and temporary acceptances become 
realized matches.  Gale and Shapley (1962) first proposed the DA mechanisms using 




Step 1:  f1, f2, f3 and f5 have no immediate competitors.  f4 and f6 have to concede 
their first choices (ω5 and ω6) to f5 and f2 respectively 
            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th        
f1 ω3   ω1   ω5   ω4   ω2   ω6     ω1 f4     f3     f1     f2     f5     f6    
f2 ω6   ω1   ω3   ω4   ω5   ω2     ω2 f3     f5     f6     f4     f1     f2    
f3 ω4   ω3   ω6   ω5   ω1   ω2     ω3 f5     f3     f6     f2     f1     f4    
f4 ω5   ω3   ω2   ω6   ω1   ω4     ω4 f6     f4     f2     f3     f1     f5    
f5 ω5   ω1   ω2   ω3   ω6   ω4     ω5 f5     f3     f2     f6     f5     f4    
f6 ω6   ω2   ω5   ω4   ω3   ω1     ω6 f2     f3     f1     f6     f4     f5    
 
Step 2: f4 and f6 “propose” to second ranked ω3 and ω2 respectively 
            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th        
f1 ω3   ω1   ω5   ω4   ω2   ω6     ω1 f4     f3     f1     f2     f5     f6    
f2 ω6   ω1   ω3   ω4   ω5   ω2     ω2 f3     f5     f6     f4     f1     f2    
f3 ω4   ω3   ω6   ω5   ω1   ω2     ω3 f5     f3     f6     f2     f1     f4    
f4 ω5  ω3   ω2   ω6   ω1   ω4     ω4 f6     f4     f2     f3     f1     f5    
f5 ω5   ω1   ω2   ω3   ω6   ω4     ω5 f5     f3     f2     f6     f5     f4    
f6 ω6  ω2   ω5   ω4   ω3   ω1     ω6 f2     f3     f1     f6     f4     f5    
 
Step 3: f4 gives way to f1, “proposes” to third ranked ω2 
            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th        
f1 ω3   ω1   ω5   ω4   ω2   ω6     ω1 f4     f3     f1     f2     f5     f6    
f2 ω6   ω1   ω3   ω4   ω5   ω2     ω2 f3     f5     f6     f4     f1     f2    
f3 ω4   ω3   ω6   ω5   ω1   ω2     ω3 f5     f3     f6     f2     f1     f4    
f4 ω5  ω3   ω2   ω6   ω1   ω4     ω4 f6     f4     f2     f3     f1     f5    
f5 ω5   ω1   ω2   ω3   ω6   ω4     ω5 f5     f3     f2     f6     f5     f4    





Step 4: f4 gives way to f6, “proposes” to fourth ranked ω6 
            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th        
f1 ω3   ω1   ω5   ω4   ω2   ω6     ω1 f4     f3     f1     f2     f5     f6    
f2 ω6   ω1   ω3   ω4   ω5   ω2     ω2 f3     f5     f6     f4     f1    f2    
f3 ω4   ω3   ω6   ω5   ω1   ω2     ω3 f5     f3     f6     f2     f1     f4    
f4 ω5  ω3   ω2  ω6   ω1   ω4     ω4 f6     f4     f2     f3     f1     f5    
f5 ω5   ω1   ω2   ω3   ω6   ω4     ω5 f5     f3     f2     f6     f5     f4    
f6 ω6  ω2   ω5   ω4   ω3   ω1     ω6 f2     f3     f1     f6     f4     f5    
 
Step 5: f4 gives way again to f6, “proposes” to fifth ranked ω1 
            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th        
f1 ω3   ω1   ω5   ω4   ω2   ω6     ω1 f4     f3     f1     f2     f5     f6    
f2 ω6   ω1   ω3   ω4   ω5   ω2     ω2 f3     f5     f6     f4     f1    f2    
f3 ω4   ω3   ω6   ω5   ω1   ω2     ω3 f5     f3     f6     f2     f1     f4    
f4 ω5  ω3   ω2  ω6   ω1   ω4     ω4 f6     f4     f2     f3     f1     f5    
f5 ω5   ω1   ω2   ω3   ω6   ω4     ω5 f5     f3     f2     f6     f5     f4    
f6 ω6  ω2   ω5   ω4   ω3   ω1     ω6 f2     f3     f1     f6     f4     f5    
 
Step 6: There are no more “ties.” Temporarily held offers becomes realized matches. 
            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th        
f1 ω3  ω1   ω5   ω4   ω2   ω6     ω1 f4     f3     f1     f2     f5     f6    
f2 ω6  ω1   ω3   ω4   ω5   ω2     ω2 f3     f5     f6     f4     f1     f2    
f3 ω4  ω3   ω6   ω5   ω1   ω2     ω3 f5     f3     f6     f2     f1     f4    
f4 ω5  ω3  ω2  ω6   ω1   ω4     ω4 f6     f4     f2     f3     f1     f5    
f5 ω5  ω1  ω2   ω3   ω6   ω4     ω5 f5     f3     f2     f6     f5     f4    
f6 ω6  ω2  ω5   ω4   ω3   ω1     ω6 f2     f3     f1     f6     f4     f5    
 





The DA algorithm yields (f1, ω3), (f2, ω6), (f3, ω4), (f4, ω1), (f5, ω5), (f6, ω2) for a 
consultant-biased logic.  Under the intern-biased logic, the resulting matches are slightly 
different: (f1, ω2), (f2, ω6), (f3, ω4), (f4, ω1), (f5, ω5), (f6, ω3). When an intern ω lists a 
consultant f in k-th place in her rank order list and the same consultant lists the intern in l-th 
place, such a (f, ω) match is called a (k ,l) list.  Note that (f2, ω6) and (f5, ω5) pairs have (1, 
1) lists, that is, f2 and ω6 both select each other as their most preferred partners (the same 
applies to f5 and ω5). Such (1, 1) matches always occur under the DA algorithm. 
 
2. Linear Programming (LP) 
Similar to DA algorithm, the LP mechanism used in the United Kingdom takes rank-
order lists of interns and consultants as inputs. However, unlike the DA algorithm, these 
choices are assigned weights denoted by αf,ω. That is, αf ω is the sum of f’s weight of ω and 
ω’s weight of f.  In the London LP mechanism, choices 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are given weights 
of 36, 28, 21, 15, 10 and 6. Thus (1,1) lists receive the weight αf ω = 72, (1, 2) and (2,1) lists 
each receive the weight αf ω = 64, and so forth. The sum of αf ω is then computed for each 
potential consultant-intern matching pair (f, ω). The resulting weights form the basis for a 
binary linear programming assignment matching interns to consultants to maximize the 
value of matches. The problem is described as follows: 
 
Max ∑ αf ωXf,ω 
Subject to ∑ αf,ω = 1 for all ω 
    ∑ αf,ω = 1 for all f 
  Xf,ω ∈ [0, 1] for all f, ω 
 
Xf,ω =  1 denotes a proposed match while Xf,ω = 0 means no match between f and ω.  
The optimal X, the matrix of ‘proposed matches,’ is determined by solving the above LP 
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problem. The agents (f, ω) who actually listed each other in their rank-order lists and for 
whom there is a proposed match (i.e., X
 
f,ω =  1) are matched to each other in the market. 
 
Example: 
            1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th                   1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th          
f1 ω3   ω2   ω1   ω5   ω6   ω4     ω1 f3     f1     f2     f4     f5     f6    
f2 ω3   ω1   ω2   ω5   ω6   ω4     ω2 f3     f1     f2     f5     f6     f4    
f3 ω2   ω1   ω3   ω5   ω4   ω6     ω3 f2     f1     f3     f4     f6     f5    
f4 ω3   ω2   ω1   ω4   ω6   ω5     ω4 f2     f3     f1     f6     f4     f5    
f5 ω3   ω2   ω1   ω4   ω5   ω6     ω5 f1     f3     f2     f6     f5     f4    
f6 ω3   ω1   ω2   ω5   ω4   ω6     ω6 f3     f2     f1     f6     f4     f5    
 
weight 36   28    21   15   10    6   36   28    21   15   10    6 
(per match per party) 
 
Figure 7.   Ranked Ordered List: LP Algorithm  (After: Ünver, 2000) 
 
Note that (f2, w3) and (f3, w2) pairs have (1, 1) lists.  The outcome of the London 
mechanism is given by  (f1 , ω5), (f2 , ω3), (f3 , ω1), (f4 , ω4), ( f5 , ω2), (f6 , ω6) which provides  
(4, 1), (1, 1), (2, 1), (4, 5), (2, 4) and (6, 4) lists. This yields a total weight of 276 (= {15 + 
36} + {36 + 36} + {28 + 36} + {15 + 10} + {28 + 15} + {6 + 15}). (f3 , ω2)’s (1 , 1) match 
is not realized in the solution.   
 
3. Priority 
Under this mechanism, each match is assigned a priority in terms of stated 
preference ranking of consultants and interns.  In the Newcastle mechanism, the priority of a 
(k, l) match is the product of the intern’s ranking of the consultant and the consultant’s 
ranking of the intern i.e., k x l.  After priorities are assigned, the matches are realized 























f1, ω1 = 3 x 2 = 6 f4, ω1 = 3 x 4 = 12 
f1, ω2 = 2 x 2 = 4 f4, ω2 = 2 x 6 = 12 
f1, ω3 = 1 x 2 = 2 f4, ω3 = 1 x 4 = 4 
f1, ω4 = 6 x 3 = 18 f4, ω4 = 4 x 5 = 20 
f1, ω5 = 4 x 1 = 4 f4, ω5 = 6 x 6 = 36 
f1, ω6 = 5 x 3 = 15 f4, ω6 = 5 x 5 = 25 
               
f2, ω1 = 2 x 3 = 6 f5, ω1 = 3 x 5 = 15 
f2, ω2 = 3 x 3 = 9 f5, ω2 = 2 x 4 = 8 
f2, ω3 = 1 x 1 = 1 f5, ω3 = 1 x 6 = 6 
f2, ω4 = 6 x 1 = 6 f5, ω4 = 4 x 6 = 24 
f2, ω5 = 4 x 3 = 12 f5, ω5 = 5 x 5 = 25 
f2, ω6 = 5 x 2 = 10 f5, ω6 = 6 x 6 = 36 
              
f3, ω1 = 2 x 1 = 2 f6, ω1 = 2 x 6 = 12 
f3, ω2 = 1 x 1 = 1 f6, ω2 = 3 x 5 = 15 
f3, ω3 = 3 x 3 = 9 f6, ω3 = 1 x 5 = 5 
f3, ω4 = 5 x 2 = 10 f6, ω4 = 5 x 4 = 20 
f3, ω5 = 4 x 2 = 8 f6, ω5 = 4 x 4 = 16 
f3, ω6 = 6 x 1 = 6 f6, ω6 = 6 x 4 = 24 
 
Figure 8.   Priority Algorithm: Score for each potential matches  (After: Ünver, 2000) 
 
The ranked ordered lists resulted in the following matches: 
Potential Match  ω's position in Q(f)  
f's position 
in Q(ω)  Priority Number
f2, ω3 = 1 x 1 = 1 
f3, ω2 = 1 x 1 = 1 
f1, ω5 = 4 x 1 = 4 
f5, ω2 = 2 x 4 = 8 
f6, ω1 = 2 x 6 = 12 
f4, ω4 = 4 x 5 = 20 
 
Figure 9.   Priority Algorithm Final Matches  (After: Ünver, 2000) 
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B. PAST SIMULATOR DESIGN 
In their study to demonstrate the relevance of a two-sided DA matching model, Ng 
and Soh (2001) constructed their matching simulations using Microsoft Excel and Visual 
Basic application software. The simulation program was termed the Agent-based 
Employment Market Simulator (ABEMS). 
 
Two-sided matching aims to match one party to his/her most preferred potential 
partner.  The ranked ordered preference lists compiled by both Sailors and Commands form 
the basis for the two-sided matching process. The ABEMS was designed to perform three 
main processes: (a) create a random list of Sailor and Command characteristics through a 
Profile generator; (b) create Sailor/Command preference lists by computing their utility 
levels based on how they scored their preferred sailor/command in terms of specified 
preference factors; and (c) create stable matching pairs based on the DA algorithm (using 
either Sailor or Command biased logic). Summary reports of the simulation runs were then 
generated.  Figure 10 provides a schematic of the components of ABEMS.  
Profile Generator 
Generation of Sailors Profiles 
Generation of Billets Profiles 
 
Preference List Generator 
 
Generation of sailors’ preferences for billets & rank order list 








Assignments of Sailors to Billets 
 




1. Profile Generator 
ABEMS started by mimicking sailor and P1/P2 billets’ characteristics as well as the 
weights both parties place on their preference factors to determine the ranking order of their 
potential matching “partners.” The ABEMS’ Profile generator module performs this task 
based on discrete probability distribution specified by the users. 
 
Sailors’ and Billets’ characteristics - Sailors and Billets are ranked as to how their 
potential matching “partners” value the characteristics they exhibit. Sailors will score billets 
based on factors that would satisfy their career/family/individual needs. On the other hand, 
billets will look for sailors with desired traits that best match their operational requirement. 
ABEMS assumes three preference factors each for sailor (promotion prospects, billet 
location, shore billet) and command (sailor’s training level, sailor’s performance, PCS cost).  
The Profile generator assigns discrete numbers ranging from 1 to 5 to denote aspects of 
each sailor/command characteristic. Except for promotion prospect of billets, such index 
values are mere representation of characteristics and are not ordinal value scores. The 
probability density function of these characteristics are based on close estimation of the 
existing situation and listed in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.   Estimated Probability Distribution Function of Sailor/Billet’s Characteristics 
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Preference Factors - The value on each preference factors is derived based on the 
degree to which a sailor’s current characteristics match his/her potential billet’s desired 
sailor’s characteristics (and vice versa). The better the characteristics match, the higher the 
score. This is translated into a separate index of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest value for a 
preference factor in the utility function. The computation of these indices is covered in 
greater detail in the next section on “Preference list generator.” 
 
Weights on Preference Factors - ABEMS assumes a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
to determine the total value that sailors/commands derive based on the various preference 
factors and these factors’ relative weights. The weight placed by the  i-th sailor on the j-th 
billet characteristic is αij (while βji denotes the weights the j-th billet places on the i-th sailor 
characteristic). These weights (αij and βji) are randomly derived through the random number 
generator function (RAND( )1) in MS Excel. 
 
2. Preference List Generator 
Preference lists are generated for the sailor over each billet and for the billet over 
each sailor based on the individual preferences of the sailor and the billet.  The preferences 
are modeled by a Cobb Douglas (multiplicative) utility function.  The Cobb Douglas utility 
function was chosen as it allows for: (1) diminishing marginal rates of return over the 
                                                 
1  RAND( ) returns an evenly distributed value between 0 & 1 (inclusive). 
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individual preference factors, and (2) trade-offs between the preference factors depending 
on individual tastes and incorporated through the weights assigned to each factor.  However, 
the Cobb Douglas utility function assumes that the factors are interdependent; that is 
consuming more of one factor will increase the value received from the other factors.   
 
a. Sailor Preference Lists 
In generating sailor preferences over each billet, the preference factors that 
are deemed important to the sailor include the billet’s promotion prospects, the fit between 
the sailor’s preferred location and the billet location as well as whether the billet is a shore 
or a sea billet.  The sailors’ total utility for the job is then modeled by the following utility 
function: 
 
Us = BPIα(P) * Lα(SPL) * BSα(BS) 
Where: 
Us = Total utility of the sailor for a particular billet 
BPIα(P) = Utility derived from promotion prospects of the billet 
Lα(SPL) = Utility derived from fit between sailor’s preferred location and 
  billet location (SPL & BL) 
BSα(BS) = Utility derived from getting a shore billet  
α(P) + α(SPL) + α(BS) = 1 
 
The weight (α) for each preference factor is generated randomly but the sum of the 
weights must equal 1.   
 
Billet Promotion Index – The Billet Promotion Index captures the satisfaction that 
sailors place on getting a high profile and more challenging job.  The higher the index, the 
more satisfaction the sailor will derive from the job as it provides a higher prospect for 
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promotion.  A score of 5 is given to a job that has high promotion prospects and a score of 1 
is given to a job that has low promotion prospects. 
 
Location Fit – The Location Fit factor captures the fit between the billet’s location 
and sailor’s preferred location.  A score of 5 indicates that there is a fit between the sailor’s 
preference and the billet location whilst a score of 1 indicates that there is no fit between the 
sailor’s preference and the billet location.  
 
Billet Shore – The Billet Shore factor captures the sailor’s satisfaction from getting a 
shore billet.  The sailor will derive greater satisfaction from a shore billet and is assigned a 
score of 5 whilst the sea billet will be assigned a value of 1, corresponding to a lower 
satisfaction level. 
 
A summary of the scores that are assigned to each preference factor is listed in Table 
2. 
 
Table 2.   Pay-off Matrix for the Preference Factors in the Sailor Utility Function 
 
Billet Promotion Index 
(BPI) 
Score Location Fit 
(L = SL-BL) 
Score Billet Sea or Shore 
(BS) 
Score 
Excellent 5 SL = BL 5 Shore 5 
High 4 SL ≠ BL 1 Sea 1 
Average 3     
Moderate 2     
Low 1     
 
Before generating the sailor preference lists, the simulator will only allow the sailor 
to apply for jobs within the sailor’s rate, that is SR and the BR must be the same.  The 
simulator then generates the Sailor’s Preference List by calculating the Sailor Utility (Us) for 
each eligible billet and ranks the billets in decreasing order of utility.    
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b. Command Preference Lists 
The preference factors that are deemed important to the command include the 
training level attained by the sailor, the quality of the sailor as determined by the likelihood 
of promotion to the next rank, and the PCS costs associated with moving the sailor to the 
job.  The command’s total utility for the job is then modeled by the following utility 
function: 
 
Uc = TLβ(TL) * SPIβ(SPI) * PCSβ(PCS) 
Where: 
Uc =  Total utility of the command for a particular sailor 
TLβ(TL) = Utility derived from training level of the sailor 
SPIβ(SPI)  = Utility derived from the performance of the sailor 
PCSβ(PCS) =  Utility derived from getting lower PCS costs  
β(TL) + β(SPI) + β(PCS) = 1 
 
The weight (β) for each preference factor is generated randomly but the sum of the 
weights must equal 1.   
 
Training Level – The training level captures the difference between the command’s 
desired training level (BTL) and the sailor’s actual training level (STL).  The difference in 
training level becomes a training gap and a larger training gap is assigned a lower score; a 
score of 5 is given when there is no training gap and a score of 1 is given when there is a 
very larger training gap.  
 
Sailor’s Performance Index – The sailor’s performance index captures the 
command’s satisfaction in being assigned a sailor who has a higher performance rating.  
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Sailors in the early promote zone are assigned a score of 5 whilst those in the not promote 
zone are assigned a score of 1. 
 
PCS Cost – The PCS factor captures the value that the command places on having a 
low PCS cost associated with the assigned sailor.  Command’s that want to minimize PCS 
Costs will prefer a sailor whose current billet is located nearer the command.  A cost matrix 
was developed and a cost score of 1 to 5 is assigned to the relative costs for moving from 
one location to another.  A score of 5 indicates a very low cost whilst a score of 1 indicates a 
very high cost.  
 
The scores assigned to the training level and sailor’s promotion index are given by 
the payoff matrix in Table 3, whilst the score for the PCS Cost factor are given in Table 4. 
 
Table 3.   Pay-off Matrix for Training Level (TL) and Sailor’s Promotion Index (SPI)  




Score Sailor’s Performance Index 
(SPI) 
Score 
No Training Gap 5 Early Promote 5 
Small Training Gap 4 Must Promote 3 
Moderate Training Gap 3 Promote 2 
Large Training Gap 2 Not Promote 1 
Very Large Training Gap 1   
 
 
Table 4.   Pay-off Matrix for PCS Cost Preference Factor in the Command Utility Function 
(5 = Very Low Cost, 4 = Low Cost, 3 = Moderate Cost, 2 = High Cost, and 1 = Very High Cost) 
 
Location W MW S NE Overseas
W 5 4 3 2 1 
MW 4 5 4 3 2 
S 3 4 5 4 3 
NE 2 3 4 5 4 




Using the values in the pay-off matrices, the simulator then generates the 
Command’s Preference List by calculating the Command Utility (Uc) for each eligible sailor 
and ranks the sailors in decreasing order of utility.    
 
3. Matching Algorithm 
The ABEMS adopts the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism described in the 
opening section of this chapter to create stable matching pairs. The DA algorithm is based 
on either sailor-biased or command-biased logic. 
 
a. Sailor Biased Algorithm 
The DA matching logic can be achieved by placing sailors’ priority over 
commands’.  This results in a sailor-biased match, which indicates that sailors who are 
matched cannot possibly find another mutually beneficial match with a billet ranked higher 
in their preference list.  The commands however, will only be matched to the sailor that is 
ranked lowest in its preference list but still represents a stable match.  In this matching 
algorithm, the utility of the sailors is maximized and utility of the commands is minimized, 
while still ensuring a stable match.  The match will be the optimal stable for the sailors as a 
group. 
 
b. Command Biased Algorithm 
The DA assignment could also be achieved by placing the command’s 
priority over the Sailor’s. This will result in a command-biased match, reflecting the current 
detailing process where detailers try to assign sailors to prioritized jobs while considering 
the sailor’s preferences. Similar to the sailor-biased matching algorithm, the commands’ 
utilities are maximized while still ensuring a stable match.  The match will be the optimal 
stable match for the commands as a group.   
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C. STRENGTH & WEAKNESS OF DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE (DA) AND 
LINEAR PROGRAMMING (LP) ALGORITHMS 
This section discusses the trade off between DA and LP mechanisms.  The priority 
mechanism is no longer in use because of problems that led to hospitals hiring interns up to 
two years in advance of their graduation dates.  Two primary issues that decide if an 
algorithm is desirable include the questions of: (a) whether stable matchings can be 
achieved and  (b) whether the welfare of the matching parties is maximized. The following 
explains the notion of stable matching and welfare maximization. The trade-off is that DA 
ensures stable matching but does not guarantee welfare maximization; the LP algorithm 
ensures welfare maximization but does not guarantee stable matching.  
 
1. Stability of Matching Algorithm 
A matching or assignment is said to be “stable if it is not blocked by any individual 
or any pair of agents” (Roth, 1990).   In our case, this means that there is no instance where 
both a particular command and a particular sailor would prefer each other above their 
assigned matches.  For example, consider the following match where Sailor 1 is assigned to 
Command A and Sailor 2 is assigned to Command B: 
 
Match: Command A Command B 
 Sailor 1 Sailor 2 
 
If Sailor 1 prefers to be assigned to Command B rather than Command A and 
Command B prefers to be assigned Sailor 1 rather than Sailor 2, a blocking pair is said to 
exist and the match is not considered stable; both Sailor 1 and Command B have an 
incentive to block the matching process and seek a match with each other.  Similarly, if 
Sailor 2 would rather not be assigned for this requisition cycle than go to Command A, 
Sailor 2 will individually block the match and the match is regarded as unstable.  
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Stable matching upholds the integrity of the mechanism, as otherwise the two 
matching parties would seek a preferred partner outside of the matching system. Both Gale 
and Shapley (1962) and Roth (1990) have shown that the DA algorithm described in Section 
A will ensure a stable match.  Stability is considered a strength as experience in the 
centralized matching markets for physicians in the United Kingdom have shown that 
achieving stability is important to ensuring the success of the matching process (Roth, 
1991).  Failure of matching systems has been attributed to unstable matches resulting in an 
increasing number of physicians and hospitals choosing to negotiate outside of the central 
matching system.  
 
Stable matchings are not guaranteed under LP mechanisms.  Note that (1,1) lists are 
not always realized in the LP mechanism.  From the example in figure 7, the pair (f3, ω1) 
could be blocked by the (1, 1) match of  (f3, ω2). 
 
Priority mechanisms can be unstable.  That is, there can be a consultant-intern pair 
who each prefers the other rather than their match.  However, a (1,1) match is always 
realized in this particular mechanism. Priority mechanisms were abandoned after several 
years of trial in the field.  In Newcastle, 80% of the lists consisted of a single choice. This 
was evidence of early agreements.  Similar centralized matching procedures failed and could 
not fix the unraveling problem that first appeared during the decentralized matching era. 
 
2. Optimality of Matching Algorithm 
In the sailor biased algorithm, there are no other stable matches in which a sailor will 
get a match that is better than the sailor-biased match whilst no command will get a match 
that is worse than the current match.  Conversely, in the command biased algorithm, there 
are no other stable matches in which a command will get a match that is better than the 
command-biased match whilst no sailor will get a match that is worse than the current 
match.  In practice, there was little difference between the two solutions (sailor or command 
biased); usually just 2 pairs reversed out of some 20,000 matches according to a study by 
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Roth (1999). The sailor/command biased logic creates a situation where either the Sailor or 
the Command will fulfill their preferences at the expense of the other.  This is a weakness of 
DA algorithm, as assignments completed under a more equitable criterion of optimality 
could improve the welfare of the system as a whole, as compared to either a sailor or 
command optimal criterion.  The primary aim of the LP algorithm was to maximize welfare 
without any bias to either party. Nevertheless, this strength of LP algorithm needs to be 
weighed against its inability to ensure stable matching. 
 
D. POTENTIAL ENHANCEMENTS TO ABEMS 
ABEMS is useful in generating the set of sailor and command preferences and 
assigning matches based on a rank ordered list of these preferences using the Deferred 
Acceptance algorithm.  However, because of the manner in which it generates the 
preferences and the matching algorithm that is used, there is room for further enhancements.  
Specifically, these involve: (1) Generation of Preferences, (2) the Utility Function; (3) Rules 
in Shortlisting and (4) Empirical comparison of Algorithms.  
 
1. Generation of Preference Factors 
The factors that the sailor uses to choose between billets are postulated to be the 
promotion prospects from going to that billet, the location of that billet, and whether or not 
the billet is a shore billet.  On the other hand, the factors that the command uses to choose 
between sailors include the extent to which the sailor meets the command’s training 
requirements, the sailor’s prior performance and the PCS costs associated with moving the 
sailor.  While these factors appear to be reasonable estimates of sailors/billets’ preference 
factors, they were mere theoretical assumptions and were not validated by rigorous survey 
results. An investigation has recently been conducted on the Aviation Support Equipment 
Technician (AS) rating by Butler and Molina (2002) to determine the actual preference 
factors for this rating. A more realistic generation of the preference factors may thus be 
obtained by incorporating their findings. 
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2. Utility Function 
The ABEMS assumes a Cobb Douglas utility function.  While the Cobb Douglas 
utility function reflects two typical economic properties (diminishing marginal rates of 
return and interdependencies between the preference factors), this may not represent 
sailor/billet utility functions.  For example, the preference factors of billet promotion 
prospects and its location need not be interrelated. Such a “substitute” characteristics also 
reduces the absolute utility score, compresses the range of utility and further underestimates 
the strength of an LP algorithm.  An alternative utility function, either totally additive or 
partial multiplicative/additive should be considered for simulation study. 
 
3. Rules in Short-listing 
The ABEMS is stringent in ensuring that fully qualified sailors are placed on the 
shortlist for matching purposes. However, the existing rule defines a sailor as being   
”qualified” only if his/her ratings are exactly the same as the billets. In reality, it is common 
for sailors to one-up, that is, hold a billet position that has a higher rating than their held 
rank. The existing stringent short-listing rule unnecessarily truncates the list of eligible 
billets and makes it much more difficult to achieve successful matching.  We should 
consider billets that are of higher or lower rate than the sailor’s held rank. The penalty for 
any non-exact rate match would be inherently present through a minimum score for the 
preference factor. The deviation would also be limited to 1 rate. 
4. Empirical Comparison of Algorithms 
Ng and Soh’s simulation study (2001) primarily investigated the following: (1) the 
optimal intervals between matching, using constant preference list lengths of 5; (2) the 
optimal preference list length (holding number of sailors and billets  constant); (3) the 
optimal preference length for increasing intervals in the requisition cycles; (4) the effect of 
increasing proportions of P1 billets in the matching process; (5) the effects of sailor biased 
and command biased matching; and (6) the optimal possible matching outcome for a 2-week 
and 8-week sample using different preference lengths. 
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The ABEMS used the DA algorithm because of the presumed high value placed on 
stable matching qualities versus other advantages of utility maximization. It did not provide 
empirical evidence to allow a vigorous comparison of the net benefits between DA and LP 
algorithms. This thesis will seek to enhance ABEMS so that results of the LP algorithm can 
be explored and compared to the DA mechanism. 
 
 5. Rank Order ‘Tie Breaker’ 
It is not uncommon for sailors and commands to derive the exact same utility level 
from more than one command and sailor, respectively, in their preference list. This may be 
due to the narrow range of utility scores inherent in the multiplicative Cobb Douglas model. 
A tie breaker is therefore necessary to derive the rank order. The ABEMS adopts a simple 
‘first-come-first-serve’ basis to break the tie. That is, for any sailors/commands that offer 
the same utility to any command/sailor, whichever sailor/command is evaluated first will be 
ranked higher. This is arbitrary. A better tie-breaker may be to fall back on the utility score 
of the preference factors derived by the sailors/commands. For example, if sailor i scores 
both command m and n equally in terms of total utility, it could rank command n higher if 
the latter provides greater utility for the most valued preference factor (e.g., promotion 
prospects) relative to the other preference factors of location and sea shore rotation. 
 
E. AN ALTERNATIVE 
An alternative to ABEMS would be to construct a simulator that incorporates the 
actual sailor/command preference factors, an alternative utility function, a less stringent 







































IV. THE NAVY ENLISTED DISTRIBUTION SIMULATOR 
(NEDSIM) 
A. OBJECTIVE OF REVISED SIMULATION EXERCISE 
The primary objective of this revised simulation exercise is to investigate the relative 
strengths of Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Linear Programming (LP) algorithms. The 
question is to see which of these methods has a net overall advantage to be subsequently 
deployed in the revised Navy Enlisted Distribution and Assignment system. The revised 
simulator will build upon prior simulation software (ABEMS) by Ng and Tan (2001). 
Relevant performance indicators (to be covered in the next section) will be derived to 
measure the main benefit and cost of the respective methods. 
 
After results were obtained from a reasonable number of simulation runs (say 100 or 
about four year’s equivalent based on a two week requisition cycle), the difference in the 
performance indicators from both algorithms will be compared using statistical analysis to 
ascertain their significance. 
 
B. PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Tangible performance statistics are required to compare the net benefits or 
shortcomings between the LP and the DA algorithms.  The performance indicators were 
formulated to measure both the quantity as well as the quality of the matches obtained via 
both methods. 
 
1. Quantity of Matches 
The main aim of the matching process is to make as many matches as possible.  To 
determine the extent to which this aim is met, the percentage of matches is obtained for the 




Percent Sailor Match = No. of Matches / Total no. of Sailors available for Matching 
Percent Billet Match = No. of Matches / Total no. of Billets available for Matching 
 
2. Quality of Matches 
Besides the quantity of matches, the quality of matches obtained is also important.  
Two main measures were formulated to determine the quality of the matches in terms of 
utility of the matches as well as the percentage of unstable matches.  The specific measures 
are the total utility per match, sailor utility per match, command utility per match and the 
percentage of unstable matches.  The measures are defined as: 
 
Average Total Utility = Total Sailor & Command Utility / No. of Matches 
Average Sailor Utility = Total Sailor Utility / No. of Matches 
Average Command Utility = Total Command Utility / No. of Matches 
Percent Unstable Matches = No. of Unstable Matches / No. of Matches 
 
3. Composite Performance Measure 
 A composite performance measure was developed to incorporate both the 
quality and the quantity of the matches.  This will provide a single measure to compare 
between the two algorithms.  The composite performance measure is defined as:  
 
CPM = Average Total Utility w(u)  * Percent Stable Matches w(SM) * Percent Matched w(M) 
 
where   w(U)  is the weight assigned to Average Total Utility 
w(SM)  is the weight assigned to Stable Matching 
  w(M)  is the weigh assigned to Successful Matches 
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For this study, it is assumed that each performance factor is weighted equally, but 
this could be adjusted in future research. For example, if there is relatively higher cost from 
unstable matching, the weightage wSM could be raised accordingly. 
 
C. DESIGN OF NEDSIM 
Prior simulation software (ABEMS) by Ng and Soh (2001) is powerful in generating 
matching results under the DA algorithm. The sub-modules that generate individual sailor 
and command characteristics as well as the preference lists are also useful. This study still 
requires similar preference list generation logic and the matching results from the DA 
algorithm. It is therefore more expedient to adapt ABEMS for these functions into the 
revised simulator. Additional capability to incorporate the Linear Programming algorithm 
and other content changes were necessary to form the final modules; in a model called the 
Navy Enlisted Distribution Simulator (NEDSim) to distinguish it from ABEMS.  NEDSim 
also incorporates a few new functions to make the simulation more realistic and complete. 
These new functions include: (1) more realistic sailor and command preference factors, (2) 
an alternative utility function, (3) the LP matching algorithm and (4) checks for unstable 
matching.  
 
1. Preference Factors 
Butler and Molina (2002) conducted surveys and focus groups on the Aviation 
Support Equipment Technician (AS) rating to determine why sailors prefer a particular billet 
and why a command prefers a particular sailor for a specific billet.  The results of the survey 
are incorporated in NEDSim.  
 
a. Sailor Preference Factors 
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Sailors were asked to answer a questionnaire to indicate preference factors 
that were important to them when considering which billet to request. The sailor preference 
factors were categorized into five main groups, consisting of job factors, location factors, 
family life factors, incentive factors and training and education factors.  Of the five factors, 
family life, location and job factors were found to be the three most important factors, with 
more than 30 percent of respondents saying that they were important. The three factors of 
family life, location and job are therefore incorporated into NEDSim. Figure 11 illustrates 


























Figure 11.   Most Important Sailor Preferences by Percentage of Respondents (N=100)  
(After: Butler and Molina, March 2002) 
 
Family Life Factor – Family life was the most important preference factor, 
with 80 percent of the chiefs and 72 percent of the E-6 and below rates saying family life 
was important.  Of the 11 family life factors, the three attributes that more than 50 percent 
of respondents cited as important include: (1) whether the civilian spouse can find a job (90 
percent of chiefs and 72 percent of E-6 and below rates), (2) co-location with the military 
spouse for sailors who were married to another active duty member (70 percent of chiefs 
and 42 percent of E-6 and below rates) and (3) the opportunity for family to accompany 
them for those who were not married to another active duty military member (60 percent of 
chiefs and 55 percent of E-6 and below rates). 
 
Location Factor – Location was cited as the next most important sailor 
preference factor, with 60 percent of the chiefs and 43 percent of those E-6 and below rates 
saying that they were important. Of the 10 location attributes, the three most important 
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attributes cited by more than 50 percent of the respondents as important, include: (1) 
affordable cost of living (70 percent of chiefs and 62 percent of E-6 and below rates), (2) 
affordability of a house (50 percent of chiefs and 62 percent of E-6 and below rates) and (3) 
easy transition to civilian life (50 percent of chiefs and 25 percent of E-6 and below rates). 
 
Job Factor – Job attributes were cited as the third most important sailor 
preference factor, with 30 percent of the chiefs and 40 percent of those E6 and below saying 
that they were important. Of the 10 job attributes, the two attributes cited by more than 50 
percent of the respondents as important, include: (1) job’s ability to help advancement (80 
percent of chiefs and 85 percent of E-6 and below rates) and (2) shore duty (60 percent of 
chiefs and 60 percent of E-6 and below rates). 
 
The sailor preference attributes that will be used in NEDSim are those that 
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Figure 12.   Most Important Sailor Preference Attributes incorporated in NEDSim by Percentage of Respondents 




b. Command Preference Factors 
Commands were asked to answer questions in the survey to rank six 
preference attributes for assigned sailors. The six preference factors included whether the 
sailor: (1) had the correct paygrade, (2) was trained enroute, (3) had the specific NEC, (4) 
had specific experience for the job, (5) was promotable, and (6) whether there would be a 
gap in assignment. It was found that the top three command preference factors, with more 
than 50 percent of respondents saying that they were important, included sailors having the 
correct NEC (70 percent), the correct paygrade (67 percent) and no billet gap (56 percent). 
However, due to the small return sample size of 26, all the command preference factors will 
be incorporated in NEDSim except for two:  being trained enroute, as the sailors have to be 
trained before they take up the billet, and whether there would be a gap in assignment, since 
this is not a characteristic of the sailor over which the command can exercise a choice.  
































Figure 13.   Most Important Command Preference Factors by Percentage of Respondents (N=26) (After: Butler 






2. Utility Function 
Two general utility functions can be used for the purposes of simulation:  the 
multiplicative form and the additive form. The multiplicative form (Cobb Douglas) allows 
for diminishing marginal rates of return for the individual factors and interrelationships 
between the individual factors subject to a total utility constraint. These interrelationships 
assume that the individual factors are affect the value derived from the other factors (e.g., a 
more preferred location factor increases the value of the visibility factors), but this may not 
be the case for job preference factors.  In fact, job preferences may be independent, since 
having more of one preference factor does not influence the individual’s utility levels of the 
other preference factors. Hence, for simulation of billet selection choices, NEDSim uses the 
additive utility function with the general form: 
 
U = α1A + α2B + α3C 
 
where:  
U   = Total utility of the sailor/billet for a particular billet/sailor 
A, B, C   = Utility derived from factor A, B or C. 
α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 
 
3. LP Matching Algorithm  
a. Utility Maximization 
The general LP model for the assignment problem has been described in 
section A.2 of Chapter 3. The preference lists for both sailors and billets are the same as 
those generated for DA matching. However, the ranked-order within the preference list has 
much greater significance for the DA algorithm than the LP method. The aim of the LP 
model is to maximize the combined utility of both sailors and billets that are successfully 
matched (The DA method emphasizes only one party’s utility depending on whether it is 
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Sailor or Command-biased). Thus, the objective function for the LP model is the sum 
product of the combined utility for any unique matching pair and the binary value of 0 or 1 
(indicating if a match occurs). In the LP example from Chapter 3, a pre-determined value is 
assigned to the matching pairs in terms of the original ranked position of sailor/billet in their 
matching partners’ preference list. For this study, the relative value of the matching pairs is 
already inherent in their combined utility. The constraints reflect the condition that each 
sailor/billet can only be matched to one billet/sailor.  
 
B. Stability of Matching 
Unlike the DA algorithm, where its benefits and shortcomings are reflected in utility 
level and percentage of matching pairs, the LP method has an additional measurement in 
terms of blocking pairs or unstable matching.  Because the LP method does not guarantee 
100% stable matching, the simulator will go through all matching pairs from the LP utility 
maximization and investigate for any blocking pairs.  
 
D. COMPONENTS OF NEDSIM 
NEDSim uses two-sided matching to match one party to his/her most preferred 
potential partner.  The ranked ordered preference lists compiled by both Sailors and 
Commands form the basis for the two-sided matching process. NEDSim was designed to 
perform three main processes: (a) create a random list of Sailor and Command 
characteristics through a Profile generator; (b) create Sailor/Command preference lists by 
computing utility levels based on sailor/command scores over specified preference factors 
with an additive utility function; and (c) create matching pairs based on both the DA and LP 
matching algorithms. Summary reports of the simulation runs are also generated.  Figure 14 
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Figure 14.   Components of the Navy Enlisted Distribution Simulator (NEDSim) 
 
1. Profile Generator 
NEDSim generates the billets’ characteristics as well as the weights that sailors and 
commands place on their preference factors to determine the rank order of their potential 
matching “partners.”  NEDSim’s Profile generator module performs this task based on 
discrete probability distributions determined through characteristics of the community used 
for the simulation.   
 
Sailors and Billets are ranked as to how their potential matching “partners” value the 
characteristics they exhibit. Sailors will score billets based on factors that would satisfy their 
career, family or individual needs. On the other hand, billets will look for sailors with 
desired traits that best match their operational requirements. NEDSim assumes three 
preference factors for the sailor (family life, location and job) and four preference factors for 
45 
the command (NEC, paygrade, experience and sailor promotability).  The Profile generator 
generates the profile of sailors and commands based on the AS community characteristics.   
 
a. Sailor Characteristics 
NEDSim profiles sailors according to their grade, NEC, experience and 
performance.  The probability distribution of the sailor’s characteristics is listed in Table 5 
and is drawn from the Enlisted Master File (EMF) for the AS rating.  
 
Table 5.   Probability Distribution of Sailor Characteristics 
  
Characteristic Probability Distribution 
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Rate of Sailor – The rate profile of the sailor is determined from the Enlisted 
Master File for the AS community.   
 
NEC of Sailor – Similar Navy Enlisted Classifications (NEC) have been 
grouped into five categories of NECs for ease of computation.  The NEC distribution is also 








Table 6.   NECs under each NEC Group for NEDSim 
 






7222, 8364, 8880 
7601, 7603, 7606, 7607 





Experience of Sailor – The AS rated sailor comes from several sea platforms 
and shore establishments.  The sea platforms include aircraft carriers (CVs), amphibious 
ships (LHDs & LHAs) and mine command ships (MCS).  Air squadron and OCONUS 
assignments are considered as fleet assignments and are classified under the other sea 
category. Shore assignments include billets in AIMD detachments, recruiting commands, 
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Figure 15.   Breakdown of Sailor Experience by Type of Platform / Establishment  
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 Performance of Sailor – The performance of the sailor is assumed to be 
normal through the five categories of not promote, progressing, promotable, must promote 
and early promote. 
 
b. Billet Characteristics 
NEDSim profiles billets according to their rate, location, promotion 
prospects of the billet and whether or not the billet is ashore.  The billet characteristics are 
listed in Table 7.  
 
Table 7.   Probability Distribution of Billet Characteristics 
 
Characteristic Probability Distribution 










Location East Coast 
(CEC) 
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Platform Profile CV 
28% 
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Billet Rate - The billet rate profile is obtained from the billet master file for 
the AS rating.   
 
Location of Billet – The billets are grouped according to the different Navy 
regions of Continental U.S., East Coast (CEC), Continental U.S., Gulf Coast (CGC), 
Continental U.S., Southwest (CSW), Continental U.S., Northwest (CNW) and Outside the 
Continental U.S., Pacific and Atlantic (OPL).   The following table lists down the proportion 
of people in each of the regions for the AS community. 
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Table 8.   Distribution of the AS rated Billets across the different Navy Regions 
 
Navy Region No. of Billets Proportion (%) 
Continental U.S., East Coast (CEC)  711 33% 
Continental U.S., Gulf Coast (CGC) 281 13% 
Continental U.S., Southwest (CSW) 548 25% 
Continental U.S., Northwest (CNW) 218 10% 
Outside the Continental U.S., Pacific 
and Atlantic (OPL) 407 19% 
 2165 100 % 
 
 
NEC – The billet NEC profile is obtained from the Billet Master File for the 
AS rated sailors. 
 
Visibility of the Billet – The visibility of the billet is an indication of how the 
billet can enhance the promotion prospects of the sailor because of the profile that is 
accorded to the sailor.  The visibility is approximated by how much the billet rate is above 
the sailor rate.  If the job requires skills that are above his current rate, the visibility of the 
billet is higher.  
 
Billet Shore and Platform – The number of sea to shore billets for the AS 
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Figure 16.   Breakdown of Sea and Shore Billets 
 
2. Preference List Generator 
Preference lists are generated for the sailor over each billet and for the billet over 
each sailor, based on the individual preferences of the sailor and the billet. The preferences 
are modeled by an additive utility function, as the individual preference factors are 
independent and not interrelated with each other.  Weights for the preference factors are 
generated randomly through the random number generator function (RAND()2) in MS 
Excel. The preference factor weights for the sailors are denoted by αfactor and the preference 
factor weights for the commands are denoted by βfactor. 
 
NEDSim will activate the simulator specifications dialog box when the user clicks 
the “start simulation” command button on the main worksheet.  The dialog box will allow 
the user to specify various parameters for the simulation, including the number of sailors to 
be matched, the number of priority 1 requisition billets, the number of priority 2/3 
requisition billets, and the preference list length.  Each field of entries and the command 
button within the Start Simulation dialog box will need to be entered or activated to 
complete one successful run. Users can proceed with one simulation run by pressing the 
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2  RAND() returns an evenly distributed value between 0 (inclusive) & 1. 
seven steps from “regenerate random numbers” to “command biased matching”. 
Alternatively, the command button “automate simulation Step(1-7) for 10 runs” allows user 
to do so automatically for 10 simultaneous runs. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Main Page of NEDSim 
  
a. Sailor Preference Lists 
In generating the sailors’ preferences over each billet, the preference factors 
that are deemed important to the sailor include family life, location, and job factors.  The 







Sailor Utility  = αFL (Family Life) + αL (Location) + αJ1 (Promotion) 
+ αJ2 (Shore) 
where : αFL + αL+ αJ1+ αJ2 =1 
(each α is generated randomly)   
 
Family Life Preference Factor – The Family Life Factor is determined primarily by 
whether the billet location favors the civilian spouse’s employment opportunities.  This 
factor is captured by the recent job growth rates at the billet location, as higher recent job 
growth rates imply that the spouse will more likely be employed.  The billet location with 
higher recent job growth rates will score higher in the Family Life factor, and the higher the 
score the more satisfaction the sailor will derive from the factor.  A score of 5 is given to a 
job that has excellent family life qualities and a score of 1 is given to a job that has low 
family life qualities.  As the billet regions comprise many cities, representative cites were 
used for the billet locations.  OCONUS locations were the most diverse as it spanned many 
world regions and it was assumed that spouses would find it harder to find jobs in OCONUS 
sites due to language and cultural barriers. 
 
Table 9.   Pay-off Matrix for the Family Life Preference Factor in the Sailor Utility Function 
 
Billet Location Representative 
City 
Recent Job Growth 
Rates3 (National 
Average = 1.88%) 
Family Life Factor Score 
Gulf Coast (CGC) Pensacola 3.94% Excellent 5 
East Coast (CEC) Norfolk 2.14% High 4 
Southwest (CSW) San Diego 2.10% Average 3 
Northwest (CNW) Bremerton 0.91% Moderate 2 
OCONUS (OPL) -- -- Low 1 
 
Location Factor – The location factor is determined by the affordability of a house in 
the billet location, whether the location has an affordable cost of living and how easy it is to 
                                                 
3 The percentage increase or decrease in available jobs over the most recent 12-month period for the cities 
of Pensacola, Norfolk, San Diego, Bremerton, as obtained from http://www.homeadvisor.msn.com (October, 
2002).   
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transit to civilian life in that location.  The affordability of owning a house and how 
affordable the cost of living is can be captured by the overall cost of living index of the 
location.  The ease of transit to civilian life can be captured by the recent job growth rates of 
the billet location.  The location factor will be proxied by the overall cost of living index of 
the representative city in the billet location since the recent job growth rates are already 
captured by the family life factor.  A score of 5 is given to a job that has excellent location 
qualities and a score of 1 is given to a job that has low location qualities.  As the OCONUS 
locations are highly diverse and aggregate data would not be representative, it is assumed 
that half the OCONUS locations have a lower of cost of living than the US and half have a 
higher cost of living than the US which gives it a score of 3 for the location factor.   
          
Table 10.   Pay-off Matrix for the Location Preference Factor in the Sailor Utility Function 
 
Billet Location Representative 
City 
Overall Cost of Living 
Index4 




Gulf Coast (CGC) Pensacola 94.9 Excellent 5 
East Coast (CEC) Norfolk 96.6 High 4 
OCONUS (OPL) -- -- Average 3 
Northwest (CNW) Bremerton 100 Moderate 2 
Southwest (CSW) San Diego 136.4 Low 1 
 
Job Factor – The job factor can be split into two sub-factors, consisting of the billets’ 
visibility and whether the billet is on shore or at sea.  The billets’ visibility ranges from low 
to excellent, and corresponding scores from 1 to 5 are assigned.  The sailor will also derive 
greater satisfaction from a shore billet and is assigned a score of 5 whilst the sea billet will 




                                                 
4 The total of all the cost of living categories weighted subjectively as follows: housing (30%), food and 
groceries (15%), transportation (10%), utilities (6%), health care (7%), and miscellaneous expenses such as 
clothing, services, and entertainment (32%).  State and local taxes are not included.  Information is obtained 
from http://www.homeadvisor.msn.com (Oct, 2002).   
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(Billet rate ≥ 2 rates above Sailor rate) 
5 Shore 5 
High 
(Billet rate = 1 rate above Sailor rate) 
4 Sea 1 
Average 
(Billet rate = Sailor rate) 
3   
Low 
(Billet rate  = 1 rate below Sailor rate) 
2   
Extremely Low 
(Billet rate ≤ 2 rates below Sailor rate) 
1   
 
In reality, sailors are not allowed to apply for billets more than one paygrade from 
the sailors’ rate.  For the purpose of the simulation, however, NEDSim permits sailors to 
apply for all jobs, regardless of the billets’ rating.  Sailors who do apply for such out-of- 
range jobs will be much less attractive to the billets they applied for.  As such, these billets 
will derive a low utility level from these sailors. This will push the sailors down the billets’ 
preference list and effectively “prohibits” such applications. The simulator then generates 
the Sailor’s Preference List by calculating the Sailor Utility (Us) for each eligible billet and 
ranks the billets in decreasing order of utility.  Figure 18 shows the “SProfiler” worksheet 
that incorporates the Sailor’s characteristics and the weightage that each Sailor assigns to 




Figure 18.   “SProfiler” Worksheet to capture Sailor’s characteristics 
 
b. Command Preference Lists 
The preference factors that are deemed important to the command include 
sailor NEC, sailor paygrade, sailor specific experience and the sailor’s performance.  The 




Command Utility = βNEC(NEC) + βpay(Paygrade) + βexp (Experience) 
+ βperf (Performance) 
where : βFL + βL+ βJ1+ βJ2 =1  
(each β is generated randomly)   
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NEC – Sailors who have the same NECs as the billet are given a score of 5, 
and sailors with NECs that are different from the billet are given a score of 1.   
 
Paygrade – The sailor’s paygrade is restricted to those up to one above and 
one below the billet paygrade.  Sailors having the correct paygrade are given a score of 5,  
sailors who have a paygrade which is one above the billet are given a score of 3, and sailors 
with a paygrade which is one below the billet are the least preferred and given a score of 1.  
 
Experience – The level of experience is separated into three levels.  Sailors 
who are from the same platform or type of unit as the billet to which they are going are 
given a score of 5.  Sailors who are from sea billets and going to another sea billet, or from 
shore billets and going to another shore billet, are given a score of 3, and sailors who are in 
a billet that is different from the billet to which they are going are given a score of 1. 
 
Performance – The performance of the sailor is separated into five categories 
of early promote, must promote, promotable, progressing and not promote listed in 
decreasing order of preference and given scores of 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1, respectively.  The 
distribution of performance scores is assumed to be normal. 
 
A summary of the pay-off matrix for the billet characteristics is given in the 
following table. 
 
Table 12.   Pay-off Matrix for Billet Characteristics 
 
NEC Paygrade Experience Performance Score 
Correct 




(Sailor Unit = Billet Unit) 
Early Promote 5 
-- -- -- Must Promote 4 
-- One above Somewhat relevant 
(Sailor Sea/Shore = Billet Sea/Shore) 
Promotable 3 
-- -- -- Progressing 2 
Incorrect 
(Sailor NEC ≠ Billet NEC) 
One below Not relevant 
(Sailor Sea/Shore ≠ Billet Sea/Shore) 
Not Promote 1 
56 
Using the values in the pay-off matrices, NEDSim then generates the 
Command’s Preference List by calculating the Command Utility (Uc) for each eligible sailor 
and ranks the sailors in decreasing order of utility.    
 
Figure 19 shows the “P1Profiler” worksheet that incorporates the P1 Billet’s 
characteristics and the weights that each billet assigns to the respective Sailor 
characteristics. 
 
Figure 19.   “P1Profiler” Worksheet to capture P1 billet’s characteristics 
 
 
In the preference list generation, the agent will prioritize the sailors’ and 
commands’ preference lists according to the returned sailor utility, US, and command utility, 
UC.  The preference lists are kept in worksheets S_P1_Pref (Sailors to P1 billets), 
P1_S_Pref (P1 billets to sailors), S_P2_Pref (Remaining unmatched sailors to P2/P3 
billets), and P2_S_Pref (P2/P3 billets to remaining sailors).  Figure 20 shows that billet 7 
offers the highest utility to sailor 1 (utility of 4.8241), followed by billet 3 with a value of 
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3.9447.  Similarly, priority 1 commands have their preference list of sailors.  For example, 
in Figure 21, sailor 7 offers the highest utility to billet 1 (utility of 4.5433), followed by 
sailor 34 with a value of 4.3091. The agent then uses the chosen matching logic (sailor or 
command biased) to find the best stable matches, while discarding the unstable matches.  
The matched sailors and billets are shown in blue. Thus, in the sample shown below, sailor 
3 is matched to billet 3.  Sailor 2 is unmatched because there are no stable matches found.  
The unmatched sailors will go for a second round generation of preference lists and 
matching logic with priority 2/3 requisition billets. 
 
 





Figure 21.   Priority 1 Commands’ Preferences for Sailors Generated by NEDSim 
 
 
3. Matching Algorithm 
NEDSim highlights two different matching algorithms: (1) the Deferred Acceptance 
(DA) algorithm and the (2) Linear Programming (LP) algorithm.   
 
a. DA Algorithm 
In the DA matching algorithm, the sailor and billets are like the interns and 
consultants as described in Section A.1 of Chapter 3. The result of assignment varies 
slightly depending on whether a Sailor or Command-biased logic is employed. For example, 
the user can activate the command-biased logic by pressing the “Command-biased Matching 
Logic” button. This triggers the simulator to start the process by first going through each 
billet’s preference lists, and then executing the iteration steps described in Chapter 3 until 
none of the shortlisted sailors are rejected. This will result in a Command-biased match. The 
commands’ utilities (but not necessarily both the sailors’ and commands’ utility) are 
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maximized while still ensuring a stable match.  The match will be an optimal match for the 
commands as a group.  Similar action will result if the user opts for a Sailor-biased logic by 
activating the “Sailor-biased Matching Logic” button.  
 
b. LP Algorithm 
The LP problem can generally be tackled by invoking the Solver add-in 
within Excel. However, the standard Solver add-in only caters to a maximum of 200 
decision variables; the sailors/billet mix using a one-month requisition cycle would be 
90/120 or potentially create 10,800 decision variables. To accommodate this larger problem 
size, an enhanced version of the Solver engine: Premium Solver Platform version 3.5 and 
the Large Scale LP Solver engine version 4.0 are employed to ensure a smooth simulation 
run. Two special worksheets: “OptTableP1” and “OptTableP2” are created to process the 
LP calculation. Figure 22 shows a snapshot of the worksheet “OptTableP1,” where the top 
half of the worksheet is the shaded table representing the dichotomic (0,1) matrix (Sailors 
and Command numbers are represented row and column-wise, respectively). The constraints 
are indicated by one row and column each to reflect the condition that there can only be one 




Figure 22.   “OptTableP1” worksheet - Optimization table 
 
 
c. Check for Blocking Pairs or Unstable Matches 
The check for blocking pairs is done using two steps: 
(1) for each sailor that is matched, determine the rank position of their 
matching billet. If the matched billet was ranked first in the sailors’ list, we can conclude 
that this is a stable match and there is no need to proceed further. The sailors would not 
want to break the match since they have been assigned to their most preferred billet. This is 
true even if the matched billet ranked them lower than other sailors in the billet’s lists. A 
blocking pair can only occur if both parties are willing and “collude” to break the match; 
 
(2) if the matched billet is not the sailors’ most preferred choice, then all 
of the higher-ranked billets in their list are examined to see if any of these billets have 
ranked that sailor higher than the sailor that was assigned by the optimization. If there is 
such a case, a blocking pair is registered. Figure 12 shows another area of the worksheet 
“OptTableP1” that incorporates these procedures. 
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Figure 23.   “OptTableP1” worksheet - matching table and “check unstable matching” button 
 
 
4. NEDSim Output 
After a successful simulation run, ABEMS will output the results of the simulation 
in the main worksheet, as shown in Figure 24 below.  The output primarily comprises the 
qualitative and quantitative performance indicators of the matching for both P1 and P2/P3 
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V. NEDSIM RESULTS & FINDINGS 
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
NEDSim models the current USN detailing process for the AS community using a 2-
week requisition cycle.  It is used to generate empirical data to compare the DA and LP 
outcomes based on their advantages and disadvantages. In particular, the study examines the 
trade-offs between stable matching but potentially lower utility under the DA algorithm and 
the potentially higher utility but unstable matching under the LP method. Both algorithms 
are assessed by the quantity as well as the quality of the matches produced.  The measure 
used to determine the quantity of matches produced is the percent matched for the sailors, 
priority 1 (P1) billets and priority 2/3 (P2/3) billets.  The measures used to determine the 
quality of matches produced are the sailors’ or commands’ utility and percentage of unstable 
matches.   
 
Under the 2-week requisition cycle, typically 60 billets are available for 
consideration while 45 sailors are available to be assigned.   In addition, the proportion of 
priority 1 billets out of the total number available for assignment is estimated to be 15%.  
The assumptions were taken from previous simulation runs conducted by Ng and Soh 
(2001), based on data compiled by Short (2000). 
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 In the simulation, the preference length is kept constant at the current norm of five, 
because we believe that it is impractical for sailors to consider more than five potential 
choices. While the simulation model is able to cater to a different requisition cycle, it is our 
intent to keep to the current arrangement. As such, the number of sailors, P1 billets and P2/3 
billets number are fixed at 45, 9 and 51, respectively, to reflect the current 2-week 
requisition cycle and P1:P2/3 ratio. The sailor and command profiles were created through a 
random process.  The utility scores for the preference factors of rating, NEC, location, 
relevant training, and promotion prospects are generated based on a derived distribution.  
The derived distribution is developed from a previous survey on what the sailors and 
commands consider important preference factors and from the actual distribution of sailor 
and billet characteristics obtained from master files for the AS community. The utility score 
for the correct rate is derived indirectly by comparing the paygrade and rate profile of sailors 
and billets. In addition, the weights assigned to each of these preference factors for the 
sailors and billets are generated randomly to simulate the relative worth of each factor to the 
individual sailor or command. For the thesis, NEDSim generated data for one hundred 
simulation runs, which is equivalent to four years equivalent of requisition cycles. 
 
B. GENERAL COMPARISON OF STATISTICS BETWEEN DA & LP 
The results for the quantity and quality of matches from the simulation are presented 
in this section. The quantity of matches is measured by the number of sailors or billets 
matched as a proportion of all available sailors and billets, and indicates the efficiency of the 
algorithm adopted.  On the other hand, the quality of matches is measured by the utility 
derived from each successful match and whether such matching is vulnerable to alternative 




1. Comparison of Percentage Matched 
Figure 25 shows the sailor and command percentage matched for P1 billets.  The 
percentage of sailors matched is lower than the percentage of commands (billets) matched, 
as the number of P1 billets (9) is much smaller than the number of sailors (45).  It is possible 
for up to 100% of commands to be matched, but only up to a maximum of 20% (9/45) of 
sailors to be matched.  The results also show that LP has a higher percentage of matches 
than DA.  Table 13 shows that the percentage of matches for sailors is 2.1% higher under 
LP than DA and the percentage of matches for commands is 10.6% higher under LP than 
DA.  The results are significant at the 0.05 level using a two-sample t-test on the means, 






Figure 25.   Sailor and Command Percentage Matched (P1 billets) 
 
Table 13.   Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for P1 Billets (Percentage Matched) 
 
 Sailor Command 
 DA LP DA LP 
Mean 0.177 0.198 0.882 0.988 
Variance 0.000407 5.869E-05 0.0102 0.00147 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 
df 127 127 
t Stat -9.776 -9.779 
P(T<=t) one-tail 1.794E-17 1.769E-17 
t Critical one-tail 1.657 1.657 
P(T<=t) two-tail 3.588E-17 3.538E-17 
t Critical two-tail 1.979 1.979 
 
 
For P2/3 billets (see Figures 26 and 27), the LP outcomes are also favorable 
compared to the DA method, and the difference in outcomes is even more pronounced than 
with P1 billets. The percentage of billets being matched is lower than that for the sailors, 
because the number of P2/3 billets (51) is now greater than the number of sailors (36).  It is 
possible for up to 100% of sailors to be matched, whilst it is only possible for up to 71% of 
billets to be matched (36/51), assuming nine sailors are matched to P1 billets.  Table 14 
shows that the percentage of matches for sailors is 16.2% higher under LP than DA and the 
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percentage of matches for commands is 11.7% higher under LP than DA.  The results are 
significant at the 0.05 level using a two-sample t-test on the means, assuming unequal 




























Table 14.   Two-Sample t-test on Means for P2/3 Billets Assuming Unequal Variances (Percentage Matched) 
  
 Sailor Command 
 DA LP DA LP 
Mean 0.195 0.357 0.142 0.259 
Variance 0.00209 0.00529 0.00113 0.00273 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 
df 167 169 
t Stat -18.898 -18.917 
P(T<=t) one-tail 1.242E-43 6.978E-44 
t Critical one-tail 1.654 1.654 
P(T<=t) two-tail 2.485E-43 1.396E-43 




2. Comparison of Utility 
The first measure of quality is the utility that both sailors and commands derive from 
any matching pair. We first discuss the difference in total utility.  Figure 28 shows the 
combined utility of the matched sailors and P1 billets for both the DA and LP method. For 
the matching process involving P1 billets, the LP method results in higher total utility.  
Figure 29 shows the total utility of the sailors and P2/3 billets for both the DA and LP 
method. Again the LP method results in higher total utility.  Based on the mean value of 
total utility, the LP’s outcome is 9.7% higher than the DA’s result for the process involving 
P1 billets, compared to the substantial 46.9% difference for the process involving P2/3 















Table 15.   Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances (Total Utility) 
 
 P1 Billets P2/3 Billets 
 DA LP DA LP 
Mean 59.477 65.274 54.982 80.757 
Variance 41.670 21.338 163.518 206.122 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 
df 179 195 
t Stat -7.304 -13.406 
P(T<=t) one-tail 4.428E-12 8.976E-30 
t Critical one-tail 1.653 1.653 
P(T<=t) two-tail 8.857E-12 1.795E-29 
t Critical two-tail 1.973 1.972 
 
Because the LP algorithm results in a higher percentage of successful matches, it is 
not a surprise that the total utility under this method consistently returns a higher score than 
those from the DA method. An alternative measure of this qualitative factor is to examine 
the average utility instead of total utility score.  The average utility is computed using the 
total utility divided by the number of successful matches. Instead of comparing the average 
utility, comparison is done with a measure of proportion called the percent average total 
utility derived by dividing the average utility by the maximum utility of 5.  The percent 
average total utility will also facilitate computing the composite score below. 
 
Figure 30 compares the percent average total utility for sailors between DA and LP 
for the matching process involving P1 billets.  There is no significant difference between the 
percent average total utility between the DA and LP methods at the 0.05 level of 




Figure 30.   Sailor Percent Average Utility (P1 billets) 
 
 
For the command’s percent average total utility, the LP outcomes are more favorable 
compared to DA (see Figure 31).  The LP method gives a 4.6% higher percent average total 
utility than the DA method at the 0.05 significance level (see Table 16).  
 
 
Figure 31.   Command Percent Average Utility (P1 billets) 
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Table 16.   Two-Sample t-test on Means for P1 Billets Assuming Unequal Variances (Percent Average Utility) 
 
 Sailor Command 
 DA LP DA LP 
Mean 0.668 0.687 0.736 0.782 
Variance 0.00594 0.00379 0.00801 0.00470 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 
df 189 185 
t Stat -1.954 -4.062 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0261 3.6E-05 
t Critical one-tail 1.653 1.653 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0522 7.19E-05 
t Critical two-tail 1.973 1.973 
 
For the matching outcomes involving P2/3 billets (see Figures 32 and 33), there is no 
difference between the DA and LP for percent average total utility for sailors but there is a 
significant difference at the 0.05 level for percent average total utility for commands.  For 








Figure 33.   Comparison of Command Percent Average Utility (P2/3) 
 
Table 17.   Two-Sample t-test on Means for P2/3 Billets Assuming Unequal Variances (Percent Average Utility) 
 
 Sailor Command 
 DA LP DA LP 
Mean 0.851 0.846 0.673 0.387 
Variance 0.00221 0.00193 0.00278 0.00971 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 
df 197 151 
t Stat 0.794 25.653 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.214 3.276E-57 
t Critical one-tail 1.653 1.655 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.428 6.552E-57 
t Critical two-tail 1.972 1.976 
 
There is an important caveat: the simulation results may underestimate the total and 
average utility from the LP results as the matching pairs under the LP algorithm may 
include some sailors or billets that do not include their matched billets/sailors within their 
first five choices.  In this case, the utility of the matched sailors/billets are assumed to be 
zero, although they still would have contributed to their partners’ utility in reality. Hence 




3. Comparison of Unstable Matches 
The LP method appears to perform better in terms of percentage matched whilst the 
DA is more favorable in the measures of percent average utility, as illustrated in the two 
sub-sections above.  However, the second qualitative measure of unstable matches tends to 
boost the advantages enjoyed by the DA algorithm.  This is because the DA method 
guarantees stable matching, which is not the case under the LP algorithm.  Figure 34 shows 
the proportion of unstable matches for both methods with P1 and P2/3 billets.  Runs with 
P2/3 billets have a much lower tendency for unstable matching due to the larger number of 
billets available which improves the chances of getting a desired match. 
 
 
Figure 34.   Percent Unstable Matches 
 
 
C. COMPARISON OF COMPOSITE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Section B illustrates the trade-offs between the measures of quantity and the 
measures of quality from the simulation runs.  It is not sufficient to evaluate the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the DA and LP method on any single measure separately, as 
DA is better in generating stable matches and generally higher average utility, whilst the LP 
is better at generating higher percentage of matches.  As such, a composite performance 
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measure that incorporates all the measures is needed for comparison.  The following 
discusses two possible composite performance measures. 
 
 
1. Composite Performance Measure 1 
The first composite score comprises three factors: (a) percent average utility; (b) 
percent of unstable matches; and (c) percentage of successful matches. The computation is 
represented by the following equation where equal weights, W1, W2 and W3, are assigned 
to each of the components:  
 
CPM1 = percent average total utilityw1 *  percent stable matches w2 *  percent 
  successful matchesw3 
 
As the number of P1 billets is much smaller than the number sailors, the percent of  
successful matches uses the total number of possible matches as a denominator rather than 
using the total number of sailors as the denominator (Percent Successful Matches = No. of 
Sailors Matched / No. of Possible Matches).  For P2/3 billets, the percent of successful 
matches is based on the average of both sailor’s and command’s percent of successful 
matches. 
 
Figure 35 shows the difference between the DA and LP algorithms for both the P1 
and P2/3 billets. From this chart, there appears to be little difference between the DA and LP 
methods for matching P1 billets.  The LP method, however, scores higher for the matching 
process involving P2/3 billets. The graphical result is confirmed by the t-tests done at the 
0.05 level shown in Table 18.  Hence, the LP algorithm is superior when there are a large 
number of billets available for matching in comparison to the number of sailors.  For smaller 










Table 18.   Two-Sample t-test on Means for Composite Performance Measure 1 Assuming Unequal Variances 
 
 P1 Billets P2 Billets 
 DA LP DA LP 
Mean 0.851 0.845 0.501 0.570 
Variance 0.00216 0.00249 0.00148 0.00113 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 
df 197 194 
t Stat 0.809 -13.416 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.210 9.18E-30 
t Critical one-tail 1.653 1.653 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.420 1.84E-29 
t Critical two-tail 1.972 1.972 
 
 
2. Composite Performance Measure 2 
The second composite performance measure is developed to cater to the possible 
overlap between the two measures of percent average total utility and percent successful 
matches in CPM1, that may have skewed the result in favor of the method that is strong in 
both these measures.  Composite Performance Measure 2 comprises two factors: (a) percent 
average total utility, (b) percent of stable matches.  The computation is represented by the 
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following equation where equal weights, W1 and W2, are assigned to each of the 
components: 
 
 CPM2 = percent average total utilityw1 * percent stable matchesw2 
 
Figure 36 shows the composite score 2 for the DA and LP algorithms in the 
matching process involving P1 billets.  From this chart, the LP method gives a much more 
favorable outcome than the DA algorithm. The composite score derived for the LP method 
is about twice that of the DA algorithm and is confirmed by the t-test performed at the 0.05 
level (see Table 19). 
 
 
Figure 36.   Composite Performance Measure 2 (P1 billets) 
 
 
The same level of difference in composite score 2 between the DA and LP 
algorithms is repeated for the process involving P2/3 billets (see Figure 37) and is again 




Figure 37.   Composite Performance Measure 2 (P2/3 billets) 
 
 
Table 19.   Two-Sample t-test on Means for Composite Performance Measure 2 Assuming Unequal Variances 
 
 P1 Billets P2 Billets 
 DA LP DA LP 
Mean 1.225 2.477 1.234 2.471 
Variance 0.00119 0.0455 0.0008 0.01303 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 
df 104 111 
t Stat -57.929 -105.157 
P(T<=t) one-tail 2.84E-81 2.7E-113 
t Critical one-tail 1.660 1.659 
P(T<=t) two-tail 5.68E-81 5.4E-113 






































VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The thesis sets out to examine the relative performance of the Deferred Acceptance 
(DA) and the Linear Programming (LP) algorithm when applied to two-sided matching.  
The two methods are the principal methods used in the market for two-sided matching 
processes.  The comparison was done through an adapted simulation engine in four parts: 
(1) the generation of sailor and billet profiles using actual sailor and billet data for a 
particular community in the US Navy, the AS community, (2) the generation of preference 
lists for both the sailor and the billet for each other based on preference factors determined 
previously via survey, (3) the simulation of matches for sailors and billets via both the DA 
and LP methods, (4) the generation of performance measures for comparison between the 
DA and LP methods.  
 
One hundred simulation runs, equivalent to one hundred requisition cycles, or about 
four years’ worth of requisitions, were conducted on NEDSim (Navy Enlisted Distribution 
Simulator). The outcomes from the DA and the LP algorithms were then compared using 
both quantitative measures (percent matches), qualitative measures (average utility score 
and stable matches) and composite measures.  Two alternative composite scores were 
developed to incorporate the trade-offs between the individual measures.  All the measures 
were weighted equally. 
 
The results of the comparison were as follows: 
 
• The LP method outperforms the DA algorithm in the area of percent matches 
for both P1 and P2/3 billets as well as for both the command and the sailor. 
 
• There was no difference between the LP and the DA methods in terms of 
average utility for sailors in P1 and P2/3 billets but LP performed marginally 
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better for commands (4.6%) in P1 billets and DA performed significantly 
better for commands in P2/3 billets (28.6%).  However, the performance for 
LP could be underestimated due to limitations in the simulation model. 
 
• DA was significantly better in stable matches for P1 billets and slightly better 
for P2/3 billets.  
 
• LP was superior to DA when the measures were combined into equally 
weighted composite scores. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the results of the simulation comparison, the US Navy may want to 
seriously consider adopting the LP method as the two-sided matching mechanism for its 
sailors. The decision will still largely depend on the relative importance the organization 
places on each component of the composite score currently equally weighted, and on the 
priority of assigning sailor only to billets in their preference list (as in the DA method but 
not LP).  Even though it is ideal to eliminate unstable matching, this factor may not be so 
desirable that it overwrites the alternative objective of achieving more matches. The results 
indicate that the proportion of unstable matching under the LP method may be manageable. 
Furthermore, private arrangements between sailors and commands out of the system may 
not be as prevalent as in other private organizations in view of the military culture and the 
size of the organization which makes it difficult for many people to be identified 
individually. 
 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are a few possible areas for further research.  The possible areas are in 
applying the model to more communities, improving the simulation model and verification 
of the results on actual sailor and command input.  The specific areas that could be studied 
include: 
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 • Examining the applicability of the simulation to another community or to a 
more general population to see if the results can be generalized. 
 
• Including more sailor and command preference factors in the simulation as 
currently only those factors favored by at least half of the survey respondents 
are included. 
 
• Including other preference factors that may be important but were not 
reflected in the previous survey that was done.  
 
• Refining the simulation program to factor actual billet and sailor profiles 
from different communities to generate the utility scores and preferences. 
 
• Conducting an actual evaluation experiment of DA versus the LP method of 
matching by using actual sailor and billet choices and selection scores.  
 
• Conduct more rigorous analysis of the impact of varying the sailor:billet ratio 
as well as the P1:P2/3 ratio on unstable matching.  
 
• Restricting the LP mechanism to conduct matches only on those billets and 
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